CHINA-AFRICA RELATIONS: AN EFFECTIVENESS OF CHINESE EXISTENCE IN AFRICA

ÇİN-AFRİKA İLİŞKİLERİ: ÇİN’İN AFRİKA’DAKİ ETKİNLİĞİ

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ABSTRACT

This work plans to put forth China’s activism and improving relations with African countries for the last decade. In this context, China’s official initiatives and economic engagements comparatively and computationally will be analyzed. It will also examine China’s foreign policy toward Africa and to analyze the driving force behind this foreign policy. The initiatives of China’s Foreign Policy towards African countries have been analyzed by means of Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) activities, bilateral official visits, lending, foreign aids, scholarships, finance and implementation of mega construction projects including Chinese Special Economic Zones and trade concessions toward African partners. The evidences show a long-term and comprehensive foreign policy aims to make China a respected and an influential member of a multi polar world. China’s Africa engagements posseses political, economic and ideological ends.

Keywords: China-Africa relations, China’s foreign policy, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)

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Anahtar kelimeler: Çin-Afrika ilişkileri, Çin dış politikası, Çin-Afrika İşbirliği Forumu (FOCAC)

1. INTRODUCTION

As having more than one billion populations and a growing market in the world, China has taken place as an economic and political power in the global arena in which China pledges offers and challenges. Unyielding economic growth has caused search for raw materials, new markets and energy resources for China’s industry. Being top trade partner with China, Africa has been one of the important raw material and oil resources for China since 2000. Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has been a discussion and cooperation forum both African and Chinese entrepreneurs and officials. Although the United State was the leader at trade volume with African states, due to the improved relations through FOCAC, China took up the volume of the United State in 2009. The African Development Bank held its Annual Meeting in China in 2007. Chinese private engagements, Chinese concessional and non concessional loans, humanitarian aid programs, infrastructure investments in the continent, contributing UN Peacekeeping missions have been escalated Chinese visibility in Africa. While China is accused of neocolonialism and sought skeptical in her venture in the continent, Chinese officials has denied these Western arguments and replicated that China is not interfering internal affairs of African states and offering ‘win-win’ projects for Africa. In this paper China’s initiatives in Africa will be analyzed in terms of encouraging motives in her orientation.

2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Chinese involvement in Africa commenced in the 1950s. In order to break US military and political encirclement, China evolved Third World policy which first time designated itself with China’s participation to the Bandung Conference in 1955. ‘Third World’ was first used at the conference and later gained widely recognition in both academic and political ground, which refers to anti colonialist national movements of fifties through seventies (Shohat, 1992). At the conference, principles of peaceful coexistence were reiterated. Later on the 1960s the principles would have been main pillars of Chinese foreign policy. The principles are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence (Yi, 2014), (Taylor, 2006). China presented itself a victim of colonialism to African partners to attract their sympathy. Sino-Soviet conflicts on ideological ground and decolonization movements in Africa have been two major determinants for China’s foreign policy toward in the 1960s. China decamped the Soviets
ideologically. Along with the Soviets, the United States was trying to isolate China. During the late 1963 and the early 1964, Zhou Enlai, Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China, visited ten African countries and delivered “Eight Principles of Foreign Economic and Technological Assistance” that draws framework of its foreign aid. By this way, it aimed to enhance its credibility and have an edge over the imperialist (the United States) and the revisionist (the Soviet Union) (Sun, 2014). To increase its influence in the continent, it propagated anti imperialist rhetoric, supported guerilla fights against Western powers, issued foreign aid and financed some major infrastructure projects. Cultural Revolution in 1966 by Mao boosted disorder its foreign policy approach in terms of diplomacy and ideological propaganda. Politics of revolution export and support for leftist groups resulted in skeptical feelings of African countries against China. They perceived its attempts as interference in their internal affairs. Domestic chaos and turbulence made Foreign Ministry of China inefficient during the following a few years of the revolution (Üngör, 2009). Between 1966 and 1970, except Cairo, China closed embassies all around the world and cut off diplomatic and political relations with the world. Thereby China’s internal matters and isolationist policies caused to fail in formulation and operation a consistent African policy.

In the 1970s, China abandoned its radical approach and adopted more reformist approach. It was recognized as a legitimate representative of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations and became a member in 1971. During the decade the primary Chinese foreign policy objective was the organization of an anti-Soviet united front in the Third World. China supported national liberations in Africa, opposition to imperialism, colonialism and super powerism (Yu, 1977). Although China had its own economic predicaments, it sustained to provide foreign aid to African countries. It got in return for new diplomatic relations with new nineteen countries up until at the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 (Sun, 2014). In this process, China discovered the importance of African countries in the United Nation voting’s.

China could claim two major political successes in Africa during the term: first, in 1972, the People’s Republic of China secured China’s U.N. seat with the support of 26 African states and second, China got more representation against Taiwan in Africa; by 1975, while eight African states was recognizing Taiwan as opposed to 37 recognized China (Chen, 1993).

It should be noted that, the President of Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 provided normalization in diplomatic relations between China and the United States. Chine aimed to balance rising the Soviet threat through improvement the relations with the West.
In 1974, China officially presented China’s new Third World policy which divided the world into three primary units: The First World of the superpowers, the United Stated and the Soviet Union; the Second World, the other industrialized powers, including Western European countries and Japan; the Third World, the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. In this formulation, the first and the second World were cooperating to sustain their hegemony over the Third World. While accepting China herself in the Third World Countries, an anti-hegemonic, she focused on the leadership position in the Third World countries against superpowers of the First World.

After Mao’s death in 1976, China decided to change its stand with other countries. China’s domestic and foreign policies were reviewed. In 1978, Chinese leaders, by the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, agreed to abandoned ideological rhetoric such as imperialism or revisionism, and ideologically motivated relations with other countries at the Second Communist Party Congress. As long as a country agreed to the Five Principles of Coexistence, China would commit good relations with it. Chinese economic development became primary concern for the leaders and overcame ideological expectations and security issues. It changed its zero-sum game understanding in international relations to non-zero and discovered importance of international cooperation. Main reforms were de-collectivization of agriculture, opening special economic zones for foreign investments and authorization to start business. Despite Nixon’s visit opened a new era for US-China relations, after US’s recognition to China as a sole representative of Chinese people in 1979, reconciliation of diplomatic relation with the United States was realized.

The importance of the African continent to China had become less and less important in the 1980s and China was mainly interested in close economic affairs with the West and Japan from which could benefit economically. As well as foreign relations in the 1980s, trade between China and Africa was tranquil. China diminished foreign aid to Africa, intensified its resources for its modernization and economic development. In this period, domestically China was promoting small-scale privatization and decentralization. Whilst Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 caused turmoil for China and the West relations and, ended with ‘honeymoon’ relationship; China reminded how much neglected African countries that watched the events silently (Taylor, 1998). The Tanzania-Zambia railway (George, 1980), which was built by Chinese workers, has been a symbol for China-Africa relations between (Yu, 1977)1960s and 1980s (Hairong, 2007).

After the Soviet Union withdrawn from Africa, end of the Cold War, US and China have become powerful actors by filling power gap (Hakan Fidan, 2010).
Moreover, Africa became an important destination for China due to the termination of superpower competition coincided with China’s economic growth. During the time Chinese companies are encouraged to work with African companies to process raw materials, establish assembly factories and join in different engineering project. Joint ventures have been established in several African countries, such that cacao producing in Cote D’Ivore, plate glass manufacturing in Kenya, cooperative activities for iron in Zimbabwe, establishment of an investment and development trade center in Mali, mining and opening first Chinese bank in Zambia (Hairong, 2007). While the years of the Cold War Chinese involvement was mostly labeled as ‘ideological’, today Chinese officials determine its policy as ‘flexible, differentiated and proactive (Mohan & Power, 2008).

Whilst China have been arguing that it emphasis on reciprocal cooperation on the ground political equality and common confidence, win-win model economic alliance and establishment of cultural networks; the Western discourse has continued that China practices neocolonialism, promotes corruption, supports illiberal and authoritarian regimes, damages anti poverty efforts and reckless in environmental issues in Africa.

Long before Chinese engagement to Africa, because of Washington and post-Washington Consensuses in 1980s and 1990s respectively, industry of the continent was heavily damaged (Hairong, 2007). Therefore Beijing Consensus vis a vis Washington Consensus became more applicable for many African countries. The Beijing Consensus was presenting more governmental involvemnt to economy, lesser loan conditionalities, Chinese technology, companies and labors, and no transfer of technology (Van Dijk, 2009).

When providing assistance to Africa, China always compiled with to the principles of ‘attaching no political strings’, ‘bilateral respect of sovereignty and national integrity’, ‘none intervention to domestic affairs’ and ‘equal treatment one another and protection shared interest’ (Wenping, 2007). China’s accomplishments in Africa only are done through persuasion (Womack, 2009). China’s African orientation not only reflects its economical interest but also its emergence as a new global power. Additionally, China has seen African countries as natural partners in resisting Western neo-interventionism (Deng, 2008). China has been seen an economic and military power, which counterbalance American hegemony in the global arena. China will be a major factor in the international economic platform, which will likely provide transformation it from unilateral to multi lateral (Kazgan, 2009).

Van Dijk enumerates eight different objectives for China’s engagement in Africa: providing raw materials for its manufacture, presenting a niche market for Chinese products and services, acquiring land for its agricultural ends,
transferring some of its population through migration, acquisition diplomatic support, becoming a superpower, instead of the current prevailed Western model presenting an alternative development model and partnership at it (Van Dijk, 2009). In the scope of this paper, China’s official initiatives and economic engagements will be analyzed.

3. OFFICIAL INITIATIVES

Since its foundation, FOCAC has been not only a discussion and cooperation forum both African and Chinese officials but also an evaluation ground for the two sides. FOCAC has been convened respectively in 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009. Third FOCAC Ministerial Conference and the Beijing Summit has been watershed for relations which explicitly concluded with declaration of FOCAC Action plan (2007-2009). Implementation of the follow up mechanism has been adopted to see improvement on the action plan which was announced first time in November 2009 at the forth FOCAC meeting. The action plan draws framework of the relations in top level ventures and close contact, diplomatic advisory mechanism, consular and judicial collaboration, cooperation in international affairs, cooperation in the field of peace and security, investment and business cooperation, trade and finance, technology transfer, cooperation in air transportation and quality supervision, development assistance, education, health, cultural exchange programs, and news media (Assembly, 2010).

The action plan was addressing to importance of reciprocal top profile ventures and close contacts in order to strength long-established understanding and common confidence, touching coordination and collaboration on mutual affairs and main worldwide and local matters (Assembly, 2010). Chinese executive officials visited 36 African countries and 36 African executive officials visited China between 2007 and 2009. Following the Beijing Summit, 20 Chinese missions arrived in Africa and 21 African missions arrived in China’s parliament. The Chinese parliament has formed parliamentary friendship caucuses with 18 African parliaments (Brown & Chun, 2009). Although four African countries recognize Taiwan, the rest fifty has recognized China. Except Somalia, it has an embassy in 49 (Shinn, 2013). In order to enhance local development and administrations, the action plan encouraged the creation of town twinning to accelerate double-sided dialogue. The number of dialogues bilaterally went up from 74 to 98 subsequent two years (Brown & Chun, 2009).

Chinese government has hosted and organized seminars, lectures, and local ventures to achieve its goal especially on local governments and among twin cities (Assembly, 2010). Chinese government gradually increased number of the Approved Destination Status of African countries, which attained 27
countries in 2009. The increase of Chinese citizens’ orientation for touristic purposes toward Africa is worth to note. In 2008 more than three hundred Chinese tourist visited the region. Chinese officials have continued to enlarge more African countries to its list of the Approved Destination Status to promote African destination (Assembly, 2010).

In addition, China doubled number of scholarship granted for African students who studying in China. To Brautigam, the number was 2,000 in 2005, 4,000 in 2009 and reached to 5,500 in 2012 (Brautigam, 2009). China has opened 23 Confucius Institutes in 16 different African countries. Xinhua, China’s official news agency has more than twenty offices in the continent (Shinn, 2013). As part of FOCAC resolutions, China organized the third China-Africa Youth Festival in 2009.

China completed to construction of 66 over 96 schools and sent teaching materials for 30 schools. In terms of health commitment for Africa, China started to construction of 28 hospitals and sent 1200 medical workers to 42 different countries (Brown & Chun, 2009).

Chinese migration to Africa commenced in the colonial period as contracted labor force and continued into the cold war period through aid missions. Increased number of Chinese population led to marriages with African and took position in African governments. Fujian and Zhejiang provinces have been actively encouraging emigration to Africa as a source of new jobs (Mohan & Power, 2008).

In 2009, it was estimated 750,000 Chinese are now living and working in Africa (Womack, 2009). In 2013, Vice-Foreign Minister of China Zhai Jun said that in the continent one million Chinese are doing businesses (Xinhua, 2013).

Japan’s economic miracle started with hosting the Olympics in 1964, and Korea’s appearance as an economic power was announced by hosting the games in 1988. It was China’s turn that, thus, China launched a big campaign to host the 2000 Olympic Games at the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing. China has not been selected for the 2000 games and did not compete for the 2004 games. The 2008 Olympics have been given China that the government made an intensive bid to win it (Shirk, 2008). Moreover 29th Summer Olympic Games and 13th Paralympic Games has been hold in 2009 in China by support of the African members of FOCAC which was promised in the action plan in 2006.

China’s engagement in Africa through FOCAC activities including bilateral official visits, cultural programs, granting scholarships, finance and
implementation of school and hospital construction projects, opening new embassies, promotion for Chinese tourists to the continent and migration to Africa led to political support in international arena. Politically, China has been using these instruments to get voting support in international organizations and diplomatic support for its communist regime.

In order to consolidate these official engagements, Chinese officials encouraged economic activities with Africa through special economic zones, lending and trade.

4. ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENTS

4.1. Chinese Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Africa

China wanted to replicate its know-how with regard to development in Africa. At an initial stage, China attempted to scaled down poverty in some states of China by the supplying of financial assistance and allowances along with foundation of economic zones; realizing that successful results can only be obtained by commercial incentives. The Chinese discovered importance of investment of infrastructure to boost economic growth (Christensen, 2010). In order to support of trade and overseas investment in 2006 the government of China released that it plans to establish globally around fifty economic zones. One of the niche continents China intended to reach a strategic and favorable position through building special economic zones (SEZs) was Africa. Although ten African governments showed interest of the SEZs as a host country at FOCAC meeting in 2006; start up countries has become Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria (two), and Zambia. By mid of 2010, six of them has been under construction. While African host countries expect to increase FDI, improvement in their infant industry and technology transfer, China likely anticipates political/strategic benefits which includes increasing exports of machinery, the enlargement of abroad trade and an escalation in ‘soft power’ through transmission of the development exemplary of China (Brautigam, 2009).

4.2. Lending to Africa

France and Britain, as important colonial powers, maintain extensive contacts with their former colonies with postcolonial international organizations. While British promotes the Commonwealth of Nations to retain her former colonies, France has still preserved military agreements that allowed her to place troops to capital of some former colonies in Africa. The former colonies have also become CFA Franc Zone members. Membership in CFA Franc Zone gives France hegemony over monetary policies and determines a shared currency. Additionally, Treasury of France becomes foreign currency
reserves holder for members. Likewise, the two former colonial powers often intervene to Africa through international organizations in which they are influential like World Bank and IMF. The countries politicize IMF requirements for their short-term benefits against in their long interest (Stone, 2004). Therefore African countries have started to lend from Chinese institutions that do not attach political strings at the agreements. China wrote off severe debts of 33 African countries, which have close relations with the Chinese government. These loans would be mature by the end of 2005. China distributed to African countries more than 2, 5 billion USD of privileged credits and 2 billion USD in preferential credits between 2007 and 2009 (Brown & Chun, 2009).

While in the 1980s Western donors have forced African states imposing Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and in the 1990s demanding democratic reforms with pressure of economic and political conditionality, African governments have attracted Chinese stance on the issue of sovereignty. The wholesale failure of SAPs facilitated China’s advance on the continent. Unlike Western donors who preoccupies with reduction of poverty, Chinese aid tends to benefits of receiving countries more directly such as constructing prestigious buildings (presidential palaces and football stadiums) (Tull, 2006). Unlike the international organizations and donors, China’s Beijing Consensus has not requested democratic reform, liberalization and good governance. This has provided more space to African leaders for rapid development.

Increasing diplomatic activity between China and the region gave birth to the China-Africa Business Council (CABC) in 2005 (Gu & Humphrey, 2006). Head Office of CABC in Beijing at the first, it has constituted five offices in major African countries, which are: Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique and Cameroon (Meja, 2014). The main goal of CABC is to facilitate and promote bilateral trade China and Africa. As it will be seen at the next section, since the establishment of CABC, the bilateral trade accelerated enormously.

Additionally, as of the early 2013, China formed joint economic commission system with forty-five and signed bilateral investment treaties with 32 African countries (The Information Office of the State Council, 2013, China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation, 2013).

4.3. Trade with Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa has been realizing one of the best economic performances since 2000. In the first decade of 2000s, 6 of the first 10 world fastest growing economies were from this region and for the time period of 2011-2015 this number has increased to 7. Moreover, while many regions suffer from low
birth rates, e.g. Europe -0.3%, Asia 0.9%, and North America 0.7%, Africa’s population is gradually increasing. It is estimated that up until 2050, Africa keeps maintaining 2.7% population growth (Undesa, 2011).

African Economic Outlook calculated the growth of the African continent an average 5.3 between 2004 and 2013 (African Economic Outlook, 2014). The growth rate at the continent is attractive both the developed and the developing countries. African market is much more attractive for the world’s largest developing country, China, to exports its products with this high growth rates.

Figure 1. The growth rate of the continent of Africa (AEO, 2014)

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Growth rate</th>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>2012</td>
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<td>2013</td>
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<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
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United Nation Economic Development in Africa Report 2011 estimates that the share of Africa in world population will increase from 15% to 27% in forty years, which will make Africa a significant source of consumer demand. If the region maintains an average growth rate of 5%, in 2020 consumer spending will rise from 860 billion USD to 1.4 trillion USD as a result of raising middle-class purchasing power. Thus, high increase in population and income together will make Africa an important import demander in the medium and the long run (Undesa, 2011).

No doubt China has become a major presence in the global multi-nodal system. There is no national economy, major or minor, exclude China as a trade partner (Womack, 2009).
China has been a donor, a financier, a contractor, an investor and a market for Africa. As economic and trade have abundantly been ahead of foreign aid in amount, China-Africa affairs clearly be identified as commercial than aid-driven. China, with its unique financing style, determined African policies not only meet its need for industry and international trade but also meet infrastructure of Africans requirement (Wang, 2007). Some scholars also support these arguments and think that China precedes economy rather than geopolitical strategic ends (Shirk, 2008).

African’s contribution to world trade is about 3.2%. Energy related products accounts for more than half of Africa’s exports products. Africa’s share in crude petroleum and natural gas of the world trade is around 18 % (Páez, Karingi, Kimenyi, & Mekalia, 2010). Having aware of these African energy resources, China has taken serious and determined engagement in energy trade. Thereby Africa has become an important trade partner as supplier of raw materials, like oil, ore, copper, cobalt, iron, manganese, and uranium; new markets and energy resources to sustain China’s growth performance since 2000. China, as a growing industry including its leading car manufacturing, acquires problems using energy recourses sufficiently. Supply disruptions and shortages may caused by political instability in oil-producing countries could threaten economic growth, raise unemployment and put the regime risk. When Chinese government came on the stage for securing energy resources policies very late, that the Western oil conglomerates had already mortgaged oil resources many of the stable African countries. Therefore China headed towards African countries that are not under US sanctions. (Shirk, 2008). The motivations behind China’s activism in Africa with unstable and anti-democratic African suppliers not only come from China’s socialist regime but also Western dominated energy market force her to deal with them as well.

China’s trade with Africa has been increasing every each year constantly, the bilateral real exchange rates to the traditional factors of trade plus those specifically identified by the literature on China’s/Africa’s trade, such as China’s ‘economic cooperation’, China’s direct investments and African governance. The econometric investigation shows that China’s exports of manufactured goods to Africa, contrary to its imports of raw materials, are significantly influenced by the real bilateral exchange rates. China’s African Financial Engagement, RER and Trade between China and Africa (Sylviane & Ping, 2014).
Figure 2. The growth of China/Africa trade (billions US$) and its share (%) of Chinese and African imports and exports.

*Source:* Data from UN UNCTADstat.

Africa in China’s import has gradually increased from 2.5 to 5 percent between 2001 and 2011. However, Africa in China’s export remained almost the same percentage with around 4 percent.

China in Africa’s import has markedly hiked from 4.5 to 12 percent; China in Africa’s exports has sharply raised from 4 to 13 percent and between 2001 and 2011.

While China-Africa trade volume was account for 10 billion dollars in the early 2000, it escalated decidedly passed 100 billion dollars in 2008. China has become the number one trade partner of Africa since 2009.

In 2012, China’s export to Africa realized 85 billion dollars and import from Africa realized 113 billion dollars. China-Africa trade volume set a new record by 198 billion dollars (The Information Office of the State Council, 2013).

China is the second top net oil importer of the world in 2009 following the United States. Africa is the second important oil supplier for China that provides almost 30% of China’s demand (Odongo, 2014). Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, South Africa and Sudan have become the top five oil and mine exporters to China. In 2005, these
countries hold more than three quarter of China’s imports from the region. China has highly benefitted from African trade. Chinese Customs reported that China had trade surplus with all African countries expect for nine in that year. This trade deficit between China and the region indicates the unequal exchange (Gu & Humphrey, 2006).

Although China’s exports were mainly low value-added products like textile and foods up until 1990s; apart from the early 2000s they started to turn into high value-added products like machines, electronics and cars. This transformation was reflected its export to Africa as well. Today, more than half of Chinese export to the region is comprised of high value-added products (Christensen, 2010).

In a previous FOCAC leader summit, Chinese and African leaders had targeted 100 billion USD for the end of 2010 (Bokilo, 2011), but trade volume between China and Africa reached 106.8 billion USD in 2008, two years ahead of the schedule (Assembly, 2010).

In 2007, China removed customs duty for about 500 products imported from 31 least developed African countries (Brown & Chun, 2009). At the Sharm el Sheikh Forum, Chinese government promised a permission of duty-free treatment for 95% of exports from the least developed African countries that have diplomatic ties with China. In order to improve business facilitates, China is going to build at least three logistic centers in different locations (Wu, 2012).

The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China made the largest investment of China with buying a 20% stake of the Standard Bank of South Africa for 5.46 billion USD in 2007 (Wong & Chan, 2003).

China’s opening up to the world that started in 1978 provided China’s economic development. It gradually liberalized its economy. China’s engagement to Africa heavily started with China’s “go-global” policy promoted Chinese state-led companies to invest Africa at the early 21st Century. At the time its raw materials and energy security needs started to be seen vital for its growing economy. Chinese companies have provided cheap manufactured goods that African governments need for their citizens on the one side, on the other side China has supplied with the needs. China’s and Africa’s economies possess complementary characteristics.

China is and will be the most important player that transforms African economy and politics. Success in Chinese SEZs in Africa, absolutely, will have reflections on political sphere. Hence it will be presented as a favorable
China-Africa Relations: An Effectiveness of Chinese Existence in Africa

transfer of China’s economic development model and may lead complicated consequences in Africa and the world politics.

China’s effort to facilitate trade with Africa through SEZs, opening logistic centers and SACSs, soft lending programs and custom duty reductions for the least developed African countries enhanced trade mutually. Thus in 2012, China-Africa trade reached almost 200 billion dollars.

CONCLUSION

A number of reasons lay ground Chinese involvement in Africa. Economically, after achieving relatively economic progress since the millennium, China turned its orientation the African market for its exports to growing middle classes in the continent and its industry that needs raw materials from the continent for its manufacture sector to sustain its growing economy. Politically, China would like to continue having support of African countries, which are comprised of one forth in international organizations like the United Nations, the World Bank and the World Trade Organizations, to strengthen its influence. Of course, as long as the economic and political successes continue, the power of the Communist Party of China will be unquestionable. Thereby, economic, political and ideological motivations are interrelated for Chinese activism in Africa.

China wants not only a multi-polar world but also having a significant voice in this multi-polar arena through support of African countries. Therefore, China’s influence on Africa will show different consequences not only in economic and trade relations in the world, but also it will lead to transformation on the power balance of international political arena.

It seems that Chinese official rhetoric on south-south relationship and promotion of development for African partners along with its private and official engagements, concessional and non concessional loans, humanitarian aid programs, infrastructure investments and contributions in UN Peacekeeping missions have provided it relative success in the continent. Although the former colonial powers, US, Japan, India and Brazil have political and economic involvement in the continent, China’s comprehensive and pragmatic policies have taken it forefront from the rivals.
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